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Abstract 
Naturalistic thinking and knowing, the tacit, experiential, and intuitive reasoning of 
everyday interaction, have long been regarded as inferior to formal reason and labeled 
primitive, fallible, subjective, superstitious, and in some cases ineffable. But, naturalistic 
thinking is more rational and definable than it appears. It is also relevant to design. 
Inquiry into the mechanisms of naturalistic thinking and knowledge can bring its 
resources into focus and enable designers to create better, human-centered designs for use 
in real-world settings. This article makes a case for the explicit, formal study of implicit, 
naturalistic thinking within the fields of design. It develops a framework for defining and 
studying naturalistic thinking and knowledge, for integrating them into design research 
and practice, and for developing a more integrated, consistent theory of knowledge in 
design. It will (a) outline historical definitions of knowledge, attitudes toward formal and 
naturalistic thinking, and the difficulties presented by the co-presence of formal and 
naturalistic thinking in design, (b) define and contrast formal and naturalistic thinking as 
two distinct human cognitive systems, (c) demonstrate the importance of naturalistic 
cognition in formal thinking and real-world judgment, (d) demonstrate methods for 
researching naturalistic thinking that can be of use in design, and (e) briefly discuss the 
impact on design theory of admitting naturalistic thinking as valid, systematic, and 
knowable. 
Keywords: formal reason; naturalistic cognition; phenomenological knowing; situated 
cognition; human-centered design; vicarious function; Brunswik‟s lens model 
Suggested Citation: Storkerson, P. (2010). Naturalistic cognition: A research paradigm 
for human-centered design. Journal of Research Practice, 6(2), Article M12. Retrieved 
[date of access], from http://jrp.icaap.org/index.php/jrp/article/view/230/194 
 
 
Published by AU Press, Canada   Journal of Research Practice 
 
Page 2 of 23 
1. Historical Background 
Western philosophy and culture have a long history of valuing explicit, formal reason, 
typified by science and discounting naturalistic thinking. Formal reason represents the 
emergence of human knowledge and wisdom over base instinct and superstition. In the 
early nineteenth century, August Comte proposed the application of formal, scientific 
constructs and methods across human domains. Comte‟s positivism is, even now, in the 
postmodern period, taken for granted as normative, for example, in the increasing 
importance of evidence-based practice in fields ranging from medicine (Cochrane, 1972; 
Evidence-Based Medicine Working Group, 1992), to education (Slavin, 2002), to art 
therapy (Gilroy, 2006), and law enforcement (Sherman, 1998). Formal methods are so 
equated with rigor and validity that they are regularly used without theoretical 
frameworks, often to generate theories bottom-up rather than to test them. “The branches 
of empirical science that have the least substantial theoretical developments often have 
the most sophisticated methods of evaluating evidence” (Suppes, 1962, p. 260). Thus, 
formal methods become fetish, giving the appearance of rigor, though without a solid 
theory of the thing being tested, one cannot know what is actually being measured. 
Theory built out of such research is ad hoc congeries and reifies prejudices. Experimental 
psychology has this problem, conspicuously in its use of contrived laboratory 
experiments, its “free floating empirical foundation” (Kirlik & Storkerson, 2010, p. 33), 
and statistical methods that cannot stand scrutiny (Cohen, 1990, 1994). Design‟s ready 
use of methods and interpretations from other fields carries the same liability. 
I need to stop briefly to clarify the language used in this article. The article is built around 
the dichotomy between deliberate, formal, thinking and knowledge, and the implicit, 
naturalistic, ecological cognition of everyday existence. Various kinds of naturalistic 
thinking and knowing have been given many different labels such as “non-conscious,” 
“unconscious,” “implicit,” “experiential,” and “embodied.” Using any one term 
characterizes this broad phenomenon as one of its characteristics, neglecting the others. 
Wherever possible, I use the terms, natural or naturalistic, and ecological, because they 
are most relevant to the focus of this article. Natural and naturalistic distinguish the 
natural world from formal systems and point to the limitations of formal systems in 
capturing natural world functioning. The term ecological refers to the ontology and 
epistemology of the natural world as it is experienced: that all knowledge starts with 
“things that are now the material of experience” (Dewey, 1925, p. 12), and it makes sense 
when it can be related back to the material of experience. It is also important to clarify the 
term abstract. It is commonly thought of as meaning divorced from reality, but that is not 
necessarily the case. What abstract means is universal: independent of any specific 
context. An abstraction can be divorced from reality if it is not or cannot be related back 
to the material of experience, and that is a bane of intellectualism (Dewey, 1925, p. 28). 
Design highlights two contradictions created by the accepted view of knowledge as 
formal knowledge. First, formal rule structured thinking is unable to do many things that 
people do, like understanding everyday language and forming judgments: “The structure 
and representation of knowledge required for intelligent action is one of the most 
problematic subjects confronting cognitive science” (Smith & Marshall, 1998, p. 333). 
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Second, the natural world is not avoidable. Within philosophy of science, Hillary Putnam 
(1962, pp. 240-251) demonstrated how abstract concepts retain naturalistic content, even 
in science. George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (Johnson, 1987, 2007; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff 
& Johnson, 1980, 1999) demonstrate the importance of naturalistic content in forming 
abstract concepts and theories. Patrick Suppes (1962, p. 259) demonstrated that even in 
scientific experiments, applying abstract theories to empirical testing requires the 
mediation of multiple models to simplify and translate formal principles into specific 
concrete operationalizations (e.g., model of the theory, model of the situation or 
experiment, model of outcome or data, model of unavoidable stray environmental 
variables that may affect outcomes or data). The theory-model relationship should be 
familiar to designers as the gap between the goals and criteria a design should fulfill and 
the determinate form of the design itself, which is at best an approximate fulfillment of 
any criteria: incomplete, with its own added attributes and its limitations, but sufficing 
under particular circumstances. Designs are natural world models of goals and criteria. 
The idea of “knowledge” is problematic in design, because design is concerned 
simultaneously with formal and naturalistic thinking in both users and designers: so much 
so that a significant part of its applied knowledge is naturalistic. On the level of design 
theory, thoughtful designers debate whether design should aspire to the formal 
knowledge of science, or the practical knowledge of artisanship (Cross, 2007), or if it 
should follow a technocratic model (Owen, 1990) and so forth. There is also debate over 
whether tacit knowledge should be placed alongside formal knowledge (Rust, 2007) and 
whether artifacts themselves can be carriers of communicable tacit knowledge/content 
(Candlin, 2000), and in some subfields of design education, formal knowledge and 
research are pedagogically and institutionally disfavored (Storkerson, 2008, 2010). 
Design is not alone in its contradictions; those contradictions reflect how the nature of 
knowledge has been changing in knowledge-based societies. As knowledge production 
has increased, and particularly as research is being shaped by social and economic factors 
(David, 1995, cited in Nowotny, Scott, & Gibbons, 2001, p. 4), the distinction between 
the context-free formal knowledge typified by science and situation-based, practical 
knowledge has been blurred, to produce “contextualized knowledge.” 
In reductionist science, still the mode to which many scientists aspire, it is 
necessary to establish clear boundaries that frame the scientific arena, and 
distinguish science from non-science. Mode-2 [contextualized] knowledge 
production, in contrast, takes place within and between open and shifting 
boundaries. It consists of the reconfiguration of knowledge and people. It is 
transgressively bounded because . . . a new kind of integration with the 
context is made possible. . . . “People have been allowed a place in our 
knowledge” and thus, “the context (can and does) speak back.” (Nowotny, 
Scott, & Gibbons, 2001, pp. 19-20)  
Contextualized knowledge, such as design, inverts a historic relationship. Science re-
forms the natural world according to its formal concepts. In contextualized knowledge, 
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the natural world re-forms formal knowledge according to its pragmatic goals and social 
order. Pragmatics is the heart of design. 
2. Two Cognitive Systems 
So, what are formal and naturalistic thinking and knowledge and how do they differ? Can 
naturalistic thinking be counted as knowledge at all? In this paper, I consider formal 
thinking as it is typically understood and practiced by non-philosophers (Johnson-Laird, 
2006). Western formal thinking has roots in Aristotelian and stoic models of valid and 
sound predicate logic (Lear, 1980). It has been heavily influenced by experimental 
science and technology as they have pervaded social life and education. Formal thinking 
is deliberative analysis using observations, concepts, and principles, in which empirical 
objects are redefined as sets of  attributes (billiard ball as a sphere with a certain mass and 
elasticity), which interact according to a set of rules called a theory. It uses complete 
(closed) systems, in which elements are unambiguously specified. Questions, such as 
“What causes heart attacks?” are not addressed directly, but through testing hypotheses 
(abductions), such as “Let‟s see if smoking causes heart attacks.” Thus, formal thinking 
cannot create models or solutions, only expose them. “Solving” an equation removes 
extraneous elements and rearranges what is left to reveal a solution that was there all the 
time. Formal thinking has its creativity, too. It can draw out unanticipated implications 
that produce gestalt changing outcomes such as the discovery of imaginary numbers. 
2.1. Naturalistic Cognition 
This article lumps various phenomena such as expertise and tacit knowledge into single 
category, begging the question of whether they actually belong together. There are 
distinct reasons for doing so. They are part of a discrete cognitive system--naturalistic 
cognition. It is a cognitive system in that it combines thinking, knowing, perceiving, 
remembering, and acting as interconnected parts of a whole rather than as separate 
faculties. It goes unrecognized because it is implicit: hidden from conscious awareness. 
Formal thinking receives natural cognition‟s outputs but is largely unaware of its 
existence (McGilchrist, 2009). Naturalistic cognition is the process through which a 
conscious body connects with its environment. It constructs perception so well that the 
world as perceived is taken to be the world that is. Naturalistic cognition is holistic, 
mimetic, and schema based rather than discretely focused, conceptual, and analytic. It 
combines perception, feeling, and action, like recoiling from touching a hot stove. 
Naturalistic cognition covers what appears to be a grab bag of phenomena: 
(a) Tacit knowledge is knowledge or skill that cannot be articulated (Polanyi, 1967; 
Reber, 1993; Reber & Lewis, 1977). It is sometimes described as knowing but not 
knowing what one knows, or knowing the right answer without knowing how it was 
arrived at. It is the dominant mode of learning in graphic and communication design. 
(b) Experience-based expertise is closely related to tacit knowledge. It often operates on 
top of a base of explicit knowledge as real-world experience that relates formal 
knowledge to specific situations as, for example, a skilled surgeon‟s judgment. 
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(c) Naturalistic thinking, judgment, and decision making represent thinking and 
knowledge outside of explicit formal knowledge, for example, use of natural language, or 
judgment under uncertainty (Beach & Lipshitz, 1993; Hogarth & Kunreuther, 1995; 
Lipschitz & Strauss, 1997). 
(d) Perceptual or “embodied cognition,” is based on everyday physical experience such as 
up or down, pushing, hunger and eating, and the associated body states of tension, 
relaxation, motion, completion, and so forth (Johnson, 2007, pp. 135-145).  
Perceptual cognition determines the characteristics of experience: the organism‟s internal 
representations of itself and its environment. One does not perceive sounds as in one‟s 
ears, or sights as in one‟s eyes. In perception, such proximal sensations are translated into 
spatial and temporal continuities with the three-dimensional objects, sounds, and events 
at distance (Gibson, 1966, pp. 7-30). Perception‟s construction of three-dimensional 
space with solid objects goes largely unrecognized, but it is striking in the blind person 
who sees using a cane (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 170). 
Affect is as integral to naturalistic cognition as it is external to formal thinking. It is so 
closely related to body and muscle states that emotional states can be induced physically 
(Stepner & Stack, 1993). Phenomenological knowing, which is the sense of knowing, is a 
naturalistic reality check indicating that something suspected or deduced is real. Capgras 
syndrome is suffered by persons who, because of brain injury, lack connections between 
visual and affective brain centers. They are able to recognize relatives but lack the sense 
of knowing. They are prone to misidentify relatives as imposters or replicants (Young, 
2007). It is a very specific injury that disrupts only visual recognition: familiar voices 
heard over telephone are identified correctly. 
Naturalistic cognition has been reassessed in recent decades, because of the growing 
interest in tacit learning (Reber & Lewis, 1977), judgment and decision making 
(Zsambok & Klein, 1997) and problem solving and situated cognition (Kirsh, 2009). The 
definition of cognition has broadened toward the construct of a hidden or implicit layer 
(often called unconscious) of cognition. 
[T]here now exists substantial evidence that the unconscious is not 
identifiably less flexible, complex, controlling, deliberative, or action-
oriented than is its [conscious] counterpart. . . . Research has demonstrated 
the existence of several independent unconscious behavioral guidance 
systems: perceptual, evaluative, and motivational. (Bargh & Morsella, 2008, 
p. 73) 
Jonathan Evans (2007) documented many “dual process” models of “conscious” (i.e., 
deliberate or explicit) and “unconscious” (i.e., implicit, naturalistic) cognition, proposed 
between 1983 and 2004 (e.g., Chen, & Chaiken, 1999; Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 
1994; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Fodor, 1983, 2001; Sloman, 1996). Table 1 below selects 
data from the larger table compiled by Evans. 
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Table 1. Dual Process Models of Cognition (after Evans, 2007) 
 
“In other words, System 2 [deliberative thinking] is a form of thinking under intentional 
level control, supported by unconscious processes in System 1 [naturalistic cognition] 
that deliver percepts, memories, and so on” (Evans, 2007, p. 258). Table 1 shows the 
emerging general model of naturalistic cognition as concrete, immediate, and connected 
to the body, bodily experience, and affect. It supports the flow of interaction, while 
deliberative thinking is abstract, analytic, dispassionate, and inhibitory, which is to say, it 
stops the flow of action. The naturalistic system is powerful. It processes and supports the 
flow of interaction in real time, and its function is not related to general measures of 
intelligence, such as IQ.  
Neural models relate formal and naturalistic cognition to brain topology: the naturalistic 
“silent” right hemisphere, the deliberative and formal left hemisphere and the corpus 
callosum, which regulates communication between them. Within a neural model, 
naturalistic knowing is intuitive, because the communications between consciousness and 
implicit processes are strictly limited. Introspection and self-reports, such as accounts of 
why one did something, can be complete fabrications. They are plausible logical 
reconstructions of processes that are not accessible, “telling more than we can know” 
(Nisbet & Wilson, 1977, p. 231). 
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Deliberative, formal thinking is dependent on implicit cognition. The literature on brain 
damage includes observations of persons whose right hemisphere (locus of implicit 
cognition) is compromised, leaving the left hemisphere (locus of deliberative cognition) 
alone. When such persons are given a well formed but factually false proposition such as, 
All monkeys climb trees; the porcupine is a monkey; so the porcupine climbs trees, they 
agree that porcupines climb trees. When they are informed or reminded that porcupines 
are not monkeys, they are unable to change their judgment (McGilchrist 2009, pp. 192-
193). The formal logic based, “computational” model of brain function as computer-like 
symbol manipulator (Pylyshyn, 1973) has been criticized (e.g., Kosslyn & Pomerantz, 
1977) for its inability to connect the brain to the natural world: the “brain in a vat” 
problem (Putnam, 1981, pp. 1-21). The case above is one of a number indicating that the 
left hemisphere by itself really can act like a brain in a vat. Other effects of isolating left 
hemisphere thinking include pathological overconfidence in one‟s judgments (no reality 
check), inability to appropriately connect need to action, and lack of empathic connection 
to others, leading to psychopathy (McGilchrist, 2009, p. 146).  
While deliberative, formal thinking is propositional and logical, naturalistic cognition is 
mimetic, built from the repetitive patterns of experience (Johnson, 2007, pp. 111-134). 
The infant‟s life is full of repetitive patterns in its environment, its behaviors and its 
interactions, as infant and caregiver mirror each other. Repetitions build patterns or 
schemas of objects, spatial configurations, events, and situations, including one‟s own 
behaviors (Kurtoglu & Stahovich, 2002, Brewer & Nakamura, 1984), which are basic 
building blocks of naturalistic cognition. Schemas are experience oriented rather than 
abstraction driven. They need not be computed but can be cued in memory (Alba & 
Hasher, 1983), as a fragment of fabric sticking up behind a desk cues perception of a 
chair, or the cracking sound of a branch cues its immanent fall and the impulse to move 
out of its way. Since schemas are based on recurrence they may individually be fallible, 
but when many are used in quasi-redundant combinations, they can be quite robust. 
Perceptual illusions are carefully contrived and often operate by limiting the information 
available.  
The mimetic, pattern sensitivity of naturalistic cognition enables it to operate where 
formal thinking cannot, by using repetitions to give form to open and ill-formed contexts, 
particularly as structured by the organism‟s physical affordances, behaviors, and goals. 
Like formal thinking, naturalistic cognition models its environment as causal and 
predictable, but natural environments are uncertain, so naturalistic cognition stresses 
quick, likely to succeed judgments and actions, with ongoing monitoring and adaptation, 
rather than complex investigation and proof of correctness (Gigerenzer, 1999). 
Naturalistic cognition is found in the intuitive understanding of addition (I + II = III), 
spatial relations, geometry, movement, and physical characteristics. Gärdenfors (2004, 
pp. 15-21) demonstrates correspondences of intuitive logic to classical geometry. Such 
implicit knowledge is intuitive and immediate, that is, without apparent reasoning. It is 
also dependent on memory and recognition, thus on the mnemonics of semantic and 
sensory patterns and features (Rubin, 1995a, 1995b). It is often expressed and 
remembered in the naturalistic form of narratives: “People will nearly always make sense 
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of their experiences by constructing them in story form, and sometimes (but not always) 
they will proceed from these stories to infer or deduce generalizations” (Baumeister & 
Newman, 1995, p. 98). 
Naturalistic cognition is not able to perform complex chains of calculations like solving 
equations, but it is able to compare large numbers of data rapidly, in parallel, to detect 
correspondences and discern coherence, or to play out possible scenarios. Because it is 
not theoretical or systematic, naturalistic knowledge is holistic (i.e., non-analytical); 
recognizing someone is intuitive, while conscious awareness of exactly what features are 
being recognized can be an entirely different matter. It is also analogical, in that new 
objects or situations can be processed according to their schematic resemblances to 
earlier ones. 
3. Naturalism in Formal Knowledge 
Formal knowledge codifies that which has been conceived naturalistically. Classical 
geometry owes much to folding and cutting (Stjernfelt, 2007, pp. 89-116). Elementary 
school students can be taught probability theory graphically. In Figure 1 below, a diagram 
decodes the mystery of central tendency in probability. One can see that even though on 
any toss a head and a tail are equally likely, three tosses in a row of heads or of tails are 
less likely than mixes of heads and tails. The mathematical formula expresses and 
summarizes the natural world model from which it is derived. 
 
Figure 1. Tree diagram of binomial probability distribution. 
It is fair to say that deliberative, formal thinking is not something that human beings do 
naturally or easily. Suppes‟ (1962) argument that people need naturalistic models to make 
use of abstract concepts and theories has been well born out. Johnson-Laird (1980, 1981) 
proposed the idea of the mental model as a naturalistic operationalization that can be used 
to project how something abstract works. Models have metaphorical and metonymic 
relations to their abstract objects, that is, the whole of the theory is represented by a 
naturalistic model that is analogous to some part of it. 
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Mental models are not merely figurative paths to constructing understanding of those 
objects; they are taken as descriptive. Their natural world entailments are transferred. 
Johnson-Laird stressed the model as an implicit plan for approaching a problem and the 
difficulties that it represents. For example, people will solve a proposition in the order in 
which it is given and miss implications that would be obvious if one examined the it in a 
different way. He also stressed the limitations of the models themselves. For instance let 
us say there are five people. The second is on the first‟s right, the third is on the second‟s 
right, and so forth. The logic of the proposition leads to the conclusion that the fifth is on 
the first‟s right, but what if they are in a circle? (Johnson-Laird, 1980, p.87). In short, 
mental models encode unrecognized assumptions (people in a line), so they break in ways 
that cannot be systematically predicted and may escape detection.  
Lakoff and Johnson (Johnson, 1987, 2007; Lakoff, 1987; Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, 1999) 
use the term metaphor. Their metaphors are equivalent to Johnson-Laird‟s models, 
because their natural world entailments are also transferred to their objects, and for that 
reason they affect how their objects can be thought about. Johnson compares the 
naturalizing metaphors in arithmetic of collections of objects to movement on a path. For 
example, three balls can be removed from a sac of five leaving two, but removing seven 
is not possible, so negative numbers make no sense here. But, negative numbers can be 
translated into movement along a path. If the next town is five miles down the path and 
one walks three miles down the path, the next town is two miles ahead. If one walks 
seven miles down the path the town is two miles back. “Consequently, these two 
metaphors are not merely alternative ways of conceptualizing the same arithmetical 
process. Their ontologies, the entities they posit, and the operations they support are not 
identical” (Johnson, 2007, p. 183). When models are used to understand abstractions, it is 
actually the models that are understood. 
It is also fair to say that formal thinking is not something that human beings do well. 
People actually accomplish formal thinking tasks by naturalistic means. Human 
limitations of serial processing and memory quickly force the use of external aids. As 
Charles Wiener was interviewing physicist Richard Feynman for a biography, he referred 
to Feynman‟s work notes as records of his thinking. Feynman retorted, “No, it‟s not a 
record, not really. It‟s working. You have to work on paper, and this is the paper. Okay?” 
(Gleick, 1993, p. 409). The physicist solves equations by spatially manipulating an 
equation‟s symbols on paper. That manipulation is based on a spatial calculation system. 
The explicit rules for transposing elements of an equation are like the moves of chess 
pieces (Brockmole, Hambrick, Windisch, & Henderson, 2008). Solving the equation is 
based on a repertory of legal  moves to achieve a spatial configuration that reveals “the 
answer” as a statement of equality. The procedure is entirely independent of what the 
terms relate to in the world. Where formulae themselves become complex, solving them 
can be like chess: using experience-based strategies for achieving the right configuration. 
These ways of naturalizing formal thinking put the idea of formal thinking as a superior 
mental process into question and demonstrate how formal thinking is entangled with 
naturalist thinking. 
Published by AU Press, Canada   Journal of Research Practice 
 
Page 10 of 23 
3.1. Naturalistic Cognition in the Natural World 
Naturalistic cognition is a continuous, real-time process of making judgments, decisions, 
and actions: figuring out what is going on, and acting to adapt to it or change it. Expertise 
in judgment and decision making is a good place to examine naturalistic cognition. In 
Dreyfus‟s five-stage model of expertise (Table 2), explicit, formal knowledge is the first 
stage. Instruction on how to use steering, clutch, and so forth provides the explicit 
knowledge that enables the student to start the process of experiential learning by actually 
driving. Competence, proficiency, and finally expertise result from acquiring tacit, 
experiential knowledge and recognition of situations, to automate those levels and 
strategically focus on the highest level of thinking: the problematic or unpredicted. 
With enough experience with a variety of situations, all seen from the same perspective 
but requiring different actual decisions, the proficient performer gradually decomposes 
this class of situations into subclasses, each of which share the same decision, single 
action or tactic. This enables the immediate intuitive response to each situation which is 
characteristic of expertise. (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 22) 
Table 2. Dreyfus’s Five Levels of Expertise (Dreyfus, 1999) 
 
Naturalistic thinking serves a different purpose from formal thinking. It interprets 
situations and resolves uncertainties. Lipshitz and Strauss (1997, p. 151), for example, 
distinguish three basic types of uncertainty: (a) uncertainty of one‟s understanding of the 
situation (one‟s theory), (b) inadequate or equivocal information, and (c) diverging or 
conflicting alternative actions. Uncertainties pervade everyday judgments (e.g., while 
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driving: Is that car going to stop? If not, should I?). Thus, decision making in the natural 
world often requires that uncertainties be resolved into a “best guess” judgment, requiring 
experiential knowledge and thinking. The solutions may not be the unique “correct” ones 
(if correct ones could even be determined), but they strive to be the best, actionable 
choices available under the circumstances, to achieve goals, avoid disasters or, at least, to 
stay in the game. Experts provide concrete, experience-based information to assess the 
situation, play out strategies, and structure the decision space.  
Naturalistic knowledge carries with it metaknowledge, such as when and where 
something was learned, from whom, the reliability and biases of the source, the 
situational context, and so forth. This contextualization, which is uncharacteristic of 
formal knowledge, is often encapsulated in narratives. Roger Schank (1990) documented 
how people react to queries differently from machines. Given a patient‟s symptoms, an 
expert system, such as the doctor‟s Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), will calculate and 
return the likely diagnoses, treatments, and other advisements according to evidence-
based practice. A colleague is more likely to tell a story that will include diagnostic and 
treatment pitfalls, patient variations, and other contextualizing metaknowledge based on 
experience. In the field of human factors, which specializes in human-technology 
interaction, the incorporation of metadata is used to address the reliability of information. 
For example, the metadata around a thermometer reading could include its accuracy, its 
reading speed and overshoot, its condition, its location, and so forth. All of these can be 
used to recalibrate one‟s interpretation of a reading or determine its reliability under the 
specific conditions (Zuk & Carpendale, 2006). There is also increasing interest in and 
research on schema-based naturalistic decision aids that come closer to Schank‟s model 
of human consultation (Smith & Marshall, 1997). 
4. Doing Empirical Research: Egon Brunswik's Ecological Approach to 
Human Judgment 
This paper has considered formal thinking and naturalistic cognition from an empirical 
standpoint rather than a speculative one. It has two practical goals: to enable naturalistic 
cognition to be an object of knowledge and to provide frameworks for studying both 
formal and naturalistic thinking. Egon Brunswik was a psychologist whose work focused 
on perception and interaction. His “lens model” and his theory of representative 
experiment design are both direct entailments of his analysis of functional human-
environment interaction. 
Brunswik‟s framework for studying naturalistic knowledge (judgment) and action that is 
well established, particularly in the field of human factors. Brunswik argued that the 
ecological interaction of the organism, human or animal, with his or her environment is 
the objective level of functioning: at which one achieves or fails to achieve goals, 
survives or perishes. He developed a theoretical and methodological approach that 
includes naturalistic cognitive processes and supports quantitative research into the 
variables underlying judgment and decision making (Goldstein, 2006). Brunswik saw his 
work as an evolution away from both Gestalt introspection and behaviorist positivism, 
toward a functional perspective that combines the richness of Gestalt accounts with a 
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rigor comparable to that of behaviorist measurements (Goldstein, 2006, pp. 11-14). 
Brunswik‟s approach has a distinctive set of characteristics: 
(a) It is centered not on stimulus-response, but on the ecological level of everyday 
interaction between organism and environment as the appropriate “objective” level of 
analysis. The relationship between the environment and the organism‟s perception and 
behavioral strategies is functional (Tolman & Brunswik, 1935, p. 61). It does not matter 
what form perception of the cliff takes or what behavior the organism uses to avoid 
falling of it as long as it does not fall off. Gibson (1966) further developed this approach 
by describing perception not as the reception of stimuli from the environment, but as the 
organism‟s active search for information to inform action. 
(b) The organism seeks to act appropriately with the environment and for the furtherance 
of its goals such as survival and reproduction (Tolman, 1951, p. 13). 
(c) The organism builds a model of the environment as cause and effect, but with high 
variability and uncertainty, which corresponds to the uncertainties of natural 
environments (Tolman & Brunswik, 1935, p. 45). 
(d) The organism does not perceive sensory inputs, but objects and events on the 
ecological level. Cognitive function utilizes and organizes the “proximal” sensory inputs 
as signs or cues to form an intentional, coherent perception of the “distal” environment 
(Tolman & Brunswik, 1935, pp. 67-73). 
(e) The organism‟s perceptual relation to its environment is semiotic. It uses sensory 
inputs as signs or cues (Brunswik, 1952, p. 22), which it uses to form perception. 
(f) The organism forms perceptions using “vicarious function,” a concept first used by 
Hunter (1932). Vicarious functioning is purposive behavior in which multiple sensory 
inputs are selected, construed, and combined by a higher level cognitive system that 
creates perception (Brunswik, 1952, pp. 16-20). 
Psychological behaviorism, of Thorndike, Watson, and Skinner, intended to remove 
consciousness and interpretation from psychology (Watson, 1913, p. 177) using a 
bottom-up approach in which simple reactions combine to form complex ones. 
Brunswik‟s roots were in Gestalt psychology, which argued that wholes are not simply 
built up from parts, but that the parts are used in the active, intentional processes that seek 
to define wholes: “There are wholes, the behaviour of which is not determined by that of 
their individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves determined by the 
intrinsic nature of the whole” (Wertheimer, 1924). Brunswik extended Gestalt theory 
beyond perception to interaction between organism and environment, including the 
organism‟s representations of its environment and itself, and its actions. Brunswik‟s 
perceptual model centers on the relationship between proximal sensory information and 
the distal environment as perceived. 
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Adequate adjustment to the world requires accurate perception and effective 
actions, and these are matters of central distal correspondence: (1) bringing 
one‟s (central) perceptions into line with (distal) objects and (2) bringing 
about (distal) states of affairs that coincide with one‟s (central) desires. 
(Goldstein, 2006, p. 12) 
Natural environments operate by cause and effect but have limited predictability. 
[C]ausal connections are probably always to some degree equivocal 
(mehrdeutig). . . . And it is indeed, we would assert, this very equivocality 
(Mehrdeutigkeit) in the causal “representation”-strands in the environment 
which lend to the psychological activities of organisms many of their most 
outstanding characteristics. (Tolman & Brunswick, 1935, p. 44, italics in the 
original) 
The answers to equivocality are redundancy and “vicarious function,” the combining and 
cross-checking whatever sensory data are at hand to build a perception and assay 
behavioral means: “Hunter, concentrates on the implications of . . . [vicarious 
functioning] upon the flexibility and exchangeability of pathways relative to an end when 
he elevates „vicarious functioning‟ to the role of the defining criterion of the subject 
matter of psychology” (Brunswik, 1952, p. 17). 
Brunswik applied the notion of vicarious function to research methodology as well. 
Experiments that are representative of human perception and interaction should study 
persons functioning on an ecological level, vicariously, using multiple cues (Brunswik, 
1956). Brunswik used this approach in his work on perceptual size and shape constancy. 
For example, the optically tiny clock on a bell tower is recognized as a much bigger 
object than the optically larger alarm clock within arm‟s reach. This work demonstrated 
that the proximal sense impressions on the retina, which may change radically, do not 
determine the object perceived. Instead, the organism uses multiple cues vicariously, for 
example, “when geometric objects . . . are shown in an indoor setting that furnishes a 
normal array of distance cues” (Wertheimer, 1924, p. 18). This approach sharply 
contrasts with the behaviorist method of testing single variables. Dreyfus made 
Brunswik‟s point with respect to studies of expertise, that is, that human expertise is 
based on vicarious function using multiple schemas from experience rather than a 
compilation of the single variables behaviorists study. 
As you all know, everyday, skilled decision making has been systematically 
overlooked in laboratory studies that study decision making outside the 
natural context in which the decision maker has experience-based expertise. 
Such studies force the subject to behave in nonskillful ways and so enforce 
the traditional account of deliberation as applying rules to situations defined 
in terms of context-free features. (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 23) 
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4.1. The Lens Model 
Brunswik crystalized his approach, in his lens model of perception and interaction, 
focusing on the functional “rapport” between organism and environment: the organism‟s 
ability to act in ways apposite to the objects and events of that environment, to achieve its 
ends. The organism needs to create a representation that maps to those aspects of the 
environment that are relevant to the organism‟s interaction and survival. The distal 
objects of the environment are made available to the organism through a series of 
mediating sensory cues along with noise and errors: spurious or stray inputs from the 
environment and stray effects of the cues. The organism‟s achievement of the perceived 
continuity of the distal object is effected through purposive “vicarious processing,” which 
flexibly combines multiple inputs as cues to form a coherent interpretation. 
 
Figure 2. The lens model: composite picture of the functional unit of 
behavior (from Brunswik, 1952, p. 20, © 1952 University of Chicago Press, 
reproduced with permission). 
Cues can be evaluated across dimensions including whether they are misleading, non-
significant, ambiguous, reliable, or where the model is used for behavior, whether 
behavioral means are good, bad, indifferent, or ambiguous in their efficacy (Tolman & 
Brunswik, 1935, cited in Hammond & Stewart, 2001, p. 17). Through such qualifiers, 
vicarious functioning incorporates metaknowledge into the information.  
4.2. Application of the Lens Model 
The lens model addresses naturalistic cognition and offers ways to systematically analyze 
how it functions in practice, including the real-life use of formal systems. It provides 
analytical tools for more systematically integrating experience-based knowledge into 
design. It is a template that can be scaled, elaborated, and extended in various ways for 
situations of varying complexity. The following example is presented to show how 
Brunswik‟s lens model is being successfully used. Here, it analytically decomposes 
judgments into cues and vicarious processing. 
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Stewart and Lusk (1994) adapted and applied the lens model to experiments in judgment 
formation in weather forecasting. The experimental task was to predict “microbursts,” 
which are localized, rapidly developing weather events that pose serious threats to 
aviation. Figure 3 shows Stewart and Lusk‟s elaboration of the lens model. 
 
Figure 3. Sequence of phases in microburst forecasting (from Lusk, Stewart, 
Hammond, & Pons, 1990, p. 628). 
Forecasters worked in facilities with informational displays indicating external conditions 
through measurements. On the basis of those displays, their training, experience, and 
judgment, forecasters predicted the likelihood of microbursts occurring within 15 minutes 
near individual airports. The stages of forecasting Stewart and Lusk studied were are as 
follows: 
(a) Doppler radar provides data measurements of the current weather situation based on 
the formal, theoretical model of microburst generation 
(b) Data are represented (numerically, using bar graphs, colors, or other methods) on 
computer displays 
(c) Forecasters visually interpret those displays 
(d) Forecasters extract cues: indicators of the current weather situation and its possible 
evolution 
(e) Finally, forecasters predict the likelihood of microbursts in various locations 
The goal of forecasting was a correct judgment of the “probability (0-100%) that a 
microburst would be produced by the storm under observation within 5-10 minutes” 
(Lusk, Stewart, Hammond, & Pons, 1990, p. 629) There were six formally defined 
“precursor cues” that forecasters were to use in forecasting: descending reflectivity core, 
collapsing storm top, organized convergence above cloud base, organized 
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convergence/divergence near cloud base, reflectivity notch, and rotation (Stewart & Lusk, 
1994, p. 63), which were displayed quantitatively but needed to be resolved into 
judgments such as “questionable,” “ambiguous,” “weak,” or “strong” (Lusk et al., 1990, 
p. 629). Forecasters also used other indicators including general weather conditions at the 
time, whether other microbursts had been sited recently in the area and so forth.  
There was no one-to-one correspondence between individual data displayed and 
precursor cues, nor between precursor cues and forecasts. Forecasters vicariously 
processed multiple data and trends over time to discern precursor cues, and they 
vicariously processed mutiple precursor cues to make their forecasts. Each forecaster also 
had metaknowledge in the form of past experience with the model and an assessment of 
its accuracy and failure modes. 
Within this representative experiment, the lens model directly supported quantitative, 
statistical analysis of forecasting as related to all of the variables above. By running a 
series of experiments in which data sets were varied, researchers could use the lens model 
to decompose forecasting judgment at each step in the process to see: 
(a) How data, alone and in aggregation, form cues 
(b) Effect of data display 
(c) How cues function under different conditions 
(d) How cues are combined and factored to judge precursor cues 
(e) How precursor cues and other data are weighed and interpreted in forming final 
judgments 
(f) Forecaster bias toward or against predicting microbursts 
(g) Regression bias: the tendency to alter predictions based on recent experience (like the 
gambler‟s belief in lucky streaks) 
(h) Effects of training methods or past instructors on forecasting 
(i) Inter-forecaster consistency: similarities and differences between forecasters 
(j) Intra-forecaster consistency: did forecasters use consistent criteria across different 
trials 
(k) Cognitive limitations of forecasters, for example, effects of time pressure, or which 
configurations of data or cues were most difficult to interpret 
Using historical data in experiments, it would be possible to measure the actual accuracy 
of forecasting: how well forecasters would have forecast benchmark situations. As a 
design tool, this research model could be used to examine and redesign any factor in the 
data selection, method of data display, procedures, training, and so forth. For example, 
displays indicate quantitative weather data that forecasters interpret qualitatively. That 
data could be displayed according to qualitative judgments.  
This weather forecasting experiment demonstrates how explicit, formal thinking and 
implicit, experiential, naturalistic thinking can be analyzed and measured, together in 
real-life situations. The lens model shows that naturalistic function can be demystified 
and studied with rigorous quantitative research, in ways that can be useful to design. This 
method makes it possible to decompose everyday judgment into component cues that 
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trigger interpretations and actions that can be addressed by design, and tested 
experimentally or measured in situ. The experiment is both theoretically and 
methodologically grounded in an approach that has a history that can be examined. It 
specifies methodological criteria for studies of normal human cognitive function, and a 
framework for the interpretation of results (Brunswik, 1956). 
Brunswik‟s lens model demonstrates that naturalistic cognition can be studied along with 
formal systems as the real world interpretation and use of formal knowledge. His model 
of representative design demonstrates the value of building an integrated theoretical and 
methodological framework as a grounded methodology that guides interpretation rather 
than the ad hoc use of borrowed knowledge. 
5. Conclusion 
Validating naturalistic cognition will change design‟s theory of design knowledge, 
toward one that is more empirical, context sensitive, limited by observation, and that can 
operate within nonformal, open-ended contexts. It will accord better with everyday 
existence, in which human beings attempt to make order and function within complex 
and evolving environments. It pushes design toward the more pragmatist and experience-
based theories of knowledge found in the works of Charles S. Peirce, and John Dewey. 
The psychological models proposed here are not yet fully formed, but they have rapport 
with a broad range of findings outside of experimental psychology, and they give a 
revealing account of their topic. This article points toward the possibility of a more 
reasonable and satisfying way of thinking about knowledge within design than the current 
ones. It mitigates much of the current debate by admitting both formal and naturalistic 
knowledge as valid, each in its own ways and for its own purposes. It also allows a more 
favorable view of theory in general within design. Dewey provides a practical starting 
point for considering a theory and its consequences: 
Does it [the theory] end in conclusions which, when they are referred back 
to ordinary life-experiences and their predicaments, render them more 
significant, more luminous to us, and make our dealings with them more 
fruitful? Or does it terminate in rendering the things of ordinary experience 
more opaque than they were before, and in depriving them of having in 
“reality” even the significance they had previously seemed to have? 
(Dewey, 1925, p. 18) 
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